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Abstract
A vast and hyper-centralized Asian empire built on the premise of an alleged cultural 
homogeneity. A small, federalist Alpine state sustained by the ideal of coexistence of 
different languages and religions. The differences between China and Switzerland could 
not be wider, and it is therefore understandable that the Swiss confederacy has been fas-
cinating Chinese intellectuals in both the modern and contemporary era. In the late Qing 
and early Republican period, Switzerland was mentioned by prominent figures like Kang 
Youwei and Liang Qichao, who praised its democracy, and in the 1920s the Swiss political 
system became a source of inspiration for “provincial patriots” in Hunan or for Chinese 
federalists such as Chen Jiongming. The present paper intends to survey these political 
encounters and perceptions, focusing on the transformation of the Swiss institutional 
model and historical experience into a “political concept”, and on the reasons for its final 
rejection as an unrealistic utopia unsuited for China.
Keywords: Chinese federalism, utopia, China and Switzerland, Kang Youwei, Liang 
Qichao, Chen Jiongming. 
Navdušenje nad Švico: sodobni kitajski intelektualci in federalistična utopija 
Izvleček
Ogromno in močno centralizirano azijsko cesarstvo je zgrajeno na predpostavki dom-
nevne kulturne homogenosti, majhna, federalistična alpska država pa vztraja pri idealu 
sožitja različnih jezikov in religij. Razlike med Kitajsko in Švico ne bi mogle biti večje, 
zato je razumljivo, da je švicarska konfederacija kitajske intelektualce navduševala tako v 
modernem kot sodobnem času. V poznem obdobju dinastije Qing in zgodnjem republi-
kanskem obdobju so Švico omenjale ugledne osebnosti, kot sta bila Kang Youwei in Liang 
Qichao, ki so hvalile njeno demokracijo, v dvajsetih letih pa je švicarski politični sistem 
postal vir navdiha za »provincialne domoljube« v Hunanu in kitajske federaliste, kot je 
Chen Jiongming. Pričujoči prispevek namerava raziskati ta politična soočanja in predstave 
s poudarkom na preoblikovanju tega švicarskega institucionalnega modela in zgodovinske 
izkušnje v »politični koncept« ter na razlogih za njegovo dokončno zavrnitev kot nereal-
istične utopije, neprimerne za Kitajsko.
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Introduction: Confucius in Switzerland
In 2010 the Chinese journal Bijiaofa yanjiu 比较法研究 (Comparative Law) 
published a paper entitled “Royal is not Necessarily Big: Common Values be-
tween China and the West through a Survey of Swiss Federalism (Wang bubi da: 
cong Ruishi lianbangzhi taolun zhongxi gongtong de jiazhiguan 王不必大: 从瑞
士联邦制讨论中西共同的价值观)”. Its author, Su Yigong 苏亦工 (1962–)—
who two years earlier had been a guest at the University of Fribourg present-
ing a lecture on Swiss federalism “from the perspective of Confucianism”—ar-
gues that the institutional and political mechanism of the Alpine confederacy 
seems to reflect many of the Confucian prescriptions on “good government”. 
More specifically, according to Su, the Swiss system is a rare embodiment of the 
“kingly way” (wangdao 王道) as opposed to the ruthless “autocratic way” (badao 
霸道), or “way of the hegemon” (Su 2010). The latter, implying concentration of 
power in one man, with an extensive use of violence and constriction, was tradi-
tionally associated with the short-lived Qin dynasty, but often extended to de-
fine any tyrannical figure censored by the Confucian orthodox historiography.1
Mixing classical quotations—from the Lunyu 论语, the Daxue 大学, the Meng-
zi 孟子 (especially with regard to its well-known theory of “the people as the 
fundament” (民本 minben)), or from the Song scholar Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 
(1092–1159)2—with descriptions of the Swiss institutional arrangement and of 
its practices, Su Yigong portrays the confederation as the almost utopian real-
ization of a harmonious polity based on consensus and local self-government. 
He writes
1 As Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan observe, “given the misuse to which the system of lords-pro-
tector (ba) was put—that is, its devolution into aggressive hegemony relying on military force—
both Mencius and Xunzi clearly think that a more legitimate and virtuous authority is needed to 
use properly such a powerful tool of statecraft” (Twiss and Chan 2012). However, under a careful 
observation the Xunzi seems to provide a more nuanced view on the issue, looking at the badao as 
a historical necessity (often leading to “decent” political experiences), rather than as a moral abom-
ination. (See also Kim 2013, and Harris 2017)
2 Besides reflecting on the minben theory, Zhang Jiucheng also rearticulated the aforementioned 
relationship between wangdao and badao as a neatly binary opposition between good and bad 
governance. 
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Switzerland is one of the few countries in the world that still make an 
extensive use of direct democracy. But where does the essence of its de-
mocracy reside? From a Confucian point of view, it is not in the fact that 
it is governed by many people, but in the fact that it does not need to 
dwell on a strong authority or on the force of violence in order to gain 
the trust of the people. (Su 2010, 123) 
Such praise from a Confucian perspective echoes the Deweyan interpretation of 
democracy, by which the diffused practices of consensus building, embodied by “cul-
tural” or “social” policies, are seen as the pathway to allow a broader political partic-
ipation among the populace, more than the normative establishment of a specific 
set or rules and mechanisms.3 No pressure from above is needed to convince the 
citizens to trust and take part into the administration, and no single (or personal) 
authority is entitled to make decisions for the entire community, thus allowing the 
public spirit to triumph over the selfish tendencies (and here, in his Swiss eulogy 
Su returns to another binary opposition inherited by the Confucian classics: the 
one between “common interest”, gong 公, and “disruptive selfishness”, si 私). The 
Swiss confederacy is presented as inspired by the “acceptance of differences” and 
the “division of power”, and favouring the bottom-up participation of “self-govern-
ing political communities” to the federal government of the country (ibid., 125). In 
conclusion, promoting an “external neutrality” and an “internal federal democracy”, 
Switzerland deserves to be defined as “closely resembling the Royal Way praised by 
the Sage Philosophers of the Chinese antiquity” (ibid., 132).
Su Yigong’s approach might be considered as a curious, partially naive, somehow 
isolated exercise in comparative analysis, inspired more by the venerable Confucian 
tradition of “praise and blame” than by scientific objectivity. However, with his pa-
per Su puts himself in continuity with a perhaps marginal—but nonetheless signif-
icant—tradition of Chinese idealized descriptions of the Swiss confederacy, which 
are the object of the present article and which will be examined in their “ideal” and 
“conceptual”—more than purely historical—entanglements and resonances. 
Conceptualizing the West: Nations as Political Models
This analysis of some modern Chinese descriptions of the Swiss political system 
is based on two assumptions. First: the observation of foreign models (specifically 
3 For an extensive analysis of how Dewey’s views on democracy resonate with modern and con-
temporary Confucian elaborations, and of how they were imported in China, see Ames and Hall 
(1999).
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Western, with the exception of Meiji Japan) was a central element in the intellec-
tual and political discussions on how to save China and build a strong state that 
developed from the late Qing to the mid-20th century. As Peter Zarrow explains 
“Educated Chinese at the end of the nineteenth century, no matter how great 
their pride in their culture’s general accomplishments, saw China as a loser, not 
a pacesetter, in the historical race”. Consequently, “they were willing to forgo 
many long-accepted ideas about political order to build a modern nation-state, 
taking as models various examples of success: Britain, Germany, France, the 
United States, Russia and Japan” (Zarrow 2012, 20). Rather than looking within 
China in search of virtuous examples from their past, as the traditional Confu-
cian understanding of history prescribed, they looked outside and forward, po-
sitioning China and the West along a linear vision of time and using Western 
institutional inspirations in order to catch up with the most advanced countries. 
In this process, “intellectual resources from the West and from China’s past 
(were) cited, translated, appropriated or claimed in moments of perceived his-
torical contingency so that something called change (might) be produced” (Liu 
1995, 30). As the collapse of the traditional order, and the very real threat of a 
partitioning of China by foreign powers, grew in intensity, the knowledge of the 
“Occidental Other” became less a neutral process of knowledge transfer, than––
as Theodor Huters points out in his study on the appropriation of the West in 
late Imperial China—a somehow forced exchange, charged with a sense of ur-
gency and anxiety. For the Chinese intellectuals of the time, then, “the recourse 
to the West was at the same time mandatory and highly distasteful” (Huters 
2005, 14). By this token, “the question of the position of Western knowledge 
became an important—if not the most important—leitmotif within late Qing 
thought, with overtones reaching throughout the twentieth century” (ibid., 45). 
Talking about the West was not an exclusive feature of the discourse promoted 
by the Westernized radicals, as Edward Fung calls them (Fung 2010, 27–58). 
Praising foreign models could mean looking at experiences as different as the 
enlightened authoritarianism of Peter the Great (as in the case of Kang You-
wei), US Republicanism (as for Sun Yat-sen), at the German centralized state, 
or at the British constitutional monarchy. In some cases these foreign examples 
could also serve to reinforce conservative positions on the necessity to nurture 
and express a “Chinese essence”, as European countries had presumably done 
in the past. Countries—or more precisely, the political system represented by 
those countries in that specific historical moment—became a pivotal part of the 
transfer of concepts between China and the outside world. Indeed—and this is 
the second assumption of the present paper—as this process was not limited to 
an objective geographical or anthropological description, but was entangled to 
political discourses, those countries became “political concepts” in themselves. 
Azijske_studije_2021_2_FINAL.indd   148 6. 05. 2021   12:47:36
149Asian Studies IX (XXV ), 2 (2021), pp. 145–164
Therefore, they can be studied, in their “translation”, “circulation” or “appropria-
tion”, through the methodological lens of conceptual history/Begriffsgeschichte—
defined as the study of concepts 
seen as focal points of interpretations and understanding; as identify-
ing regularities and differences in human discourse; as windows through 
which we can appreciate how comprehensions of the world are organized 
and brought to bear on action. (Steinmetz, Freeden and Fernández-Se-
bastián 2017, 1–2) 
In this regard, “nation-concepts” can be observed as undergoing all the four pro-
cesses defined by Reinhart Koselleck as pertaining to the Sattelzeit—the sad-
dle-epoch in which a “jump to modernity” took place in 18th century Europe. 
They were “temporalized”—by virtue of a linear understanding of history; they 
were “politicized”—as part of a political discourse on how to reform China; they 
were subsequently “ideologizable”, in other words they could be used in the con-
struction of an ideology; they were “democratized”—as knowledge of the foreign 
countries became an essential part of a much broader debate than the pre-1850s 
discussions on the external world, which were limited to the elite. 
When we look at the circulation of these concepts, we are also exploring two di-
mensions of “comparative political thought”, following the guidelines by Michael 
Freeden and Andrew Vincent, namely “the self-understanding of the entity in 
question” (China, in this case), and “how the entity understands others” (Freeden 
and Vincent 2013, 12).
Within this framework, I will try to show that the “nation-concept” of Switzer-
land presented some interesting and unique features. More specifically, it was per-
meated by a utopian nuance from the beginning of its transfer into China, some-
thing which—as witnessed by Su Yigong’s article—has survived until today. 
Why was Switzerland-as-a-concept temporalized by being positioned at the end 
of history—if we intend Utopia as a premonition of the final stage of mankind’s 
evolution, the non plus ultra of historical development? Why did it become a 
counter-concept to the traditional Chinese political order—if by “traditional” we 
intend the centralized, monarchical and authoritarian model that was blamed by 
the late Qing modernizers (as well as by the late Ming reformers)? And why was 
it presented to the public as an unreachable option for China? 
I will argue that the answer to this confinement of the Swiss model to the realm 
of utopia is to be found not so much in the democratic nature of Switzerland 
(which also plays a role in the Chinese fascination with it, of course), but in its 
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de-centralized structure—both administratively and culturally—and in its bot-
tom-up processes of political legitimation: in other words in its radical federalism. 
The “Peach Blossom Spring” of the West
The idealization of the Swiss system—or its conceptualization as a utopian politi-
cal order—was already explicitly discernible in the first description of the country 
circulating in modern China. 
In 1849, at a moment in which the knowledge of the Western world was an al-
most virgin field of inquiry, and yet a matter of pressing urgence, Xu Jishe 徐继
畬 (1795–1873) wrote the Yinghuan zhilüe 瀛环志略 (A Short Account of the Mar-
itime Circuit), a text whose production and circulation overlaps with the more fa-
mous Haiguo tuzhi 海国图志 (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms) by 
Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794–1857), which in its third edition, completed in 1852 and 
marking a pivotal moment in the Qing understanding of the external world,4 con-
tains passages identical to Xu’s work. 
In the fifth chapters of his atlas, Xu depicts the small Alpine country. There, in 
the author’s personal remarks concluding the survey, Switzerland is described as 
the “Western land of happiness” (Xitu zhi lejiao 西土之乐郊), a land in which 
the “thought of liberty” has thrived, a spot “untouched by military invasions” and 
“admired by all the Western countries”. The importance of local government is 
stressed as the historical peculiarity of the country: “At first Switzerland was di-
vided into three parts, then in 13, and they all elect their local administration.” “I 
would say that Switzerland is the Peach Blossom Spring of the West”, Xu con-
cludes (Xu 1849, juan 5).5 
With this last observation, Xu presents a Western country as the realization of a 
popular Chinese fictional topos, introduced in the eponymous work by the poet 
Tao Yuanming 陶渊明 (365?–427) in the 5th century. In his short poem Tao-
hua yuan 桃花源 (The Peach Blossom Spring), Tao had imagined a small and idyl-
lic community undisturbed by the unification of the Qin Empire, in which a 
communal and pre-Imperial way of life had been preserved in the midst of a 
pristine natural environment. This narrative, reused and reshaped throughout the 
4 To quote Peter Michell, in Wei’s work “errors occurred, particularly in the confused description of 
Western religions, but still it was commendably accurate, illustrating a comprehensive inquisitive-
ness and detailed attention to facets of barbarian culture outside of mere curiosities and exoticisms 
meant for the reader’s amusement” (Mitchell 1972, 192).
5 Wei Yuan will include Xu’s chapter on Switzerland in the third edition of his famous Atlas, without 
altering a single word (the reference to the Peach Blossom Spring included).
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following centuries, has often (but not unanimously) been credited as the first 
example of utopian literature in China (see Zhang 2002). Through Xu’s literary 
comparison, Switzerland is thus put in connection with Tao’s anti-authoritari-
an dream, and indirectly contrasted to the badao imposed on China by the First 
Emperor and later allegedly preserved across the dynasties. The Swiss political 
system—sketched by Xu in its basic features, through which its strong local and 
anti-centralist orientation are highlighted—is de facto praised as an anti-author-
itarian (anti-Legalist, to frame it in the traditional philosophical debate of Im-
perial China) model of governance. At the same time, however, by comparing it 
to the non-historical community described in Tao’s fictional poem, it is pushed 
to the borders of utopia. In other words, rather than being presented as a credible 
political model to be used—at least for inspiration, if not for full adoption—it is 
de-historicized, and treated as a fascinating but ultimately useless antipodean po-
litical structure coming from the “far West”. 
The perception of the Swiss model as exotic and useless (in political terms), be-
comes even clearer when looking at how, in the same text, Xu Jiyu introduces 
another federal country of 19th century Europe, Germany (Xu 1849, juan 4). In 
contrast to the utopian treatment reserved for Swiss federalism, the German ex-
ample is conceptually adapted to the Chinese context by connecting it not to a 
fable-poem, but to a historical precedent: namely, the fengjian (封建) system. The 
latter, following Arif Dirlik’s definition, indicated 
something akin to a ritual enfeoffment, or the establishment of a fief, that 
prevailed during the early Zhou dynasty, when the Zhou kings formally 
made grants of land and labor to their subordinates, creating a landed no-
bility with whom they shared the administration of the Zhou territories. 
(Dirlik 1996, 229) 
As will be discussed later in this article, the association of a modern federal system 
with the Zhou model of shared governance—used here by Xu as a way to familiar-
ize his audience with a foreign political structure—would ultimately strike a fatal 
blow to the aspirations of Chinese federal movements in the early 20th century.
“Turning Swiss”: A Model for Independence
As the crisis of the Qing Empire accelerated towards its dramatic conclusion, ref-
erences to Switzerland started appearing in texts charged with a clearer political 
urgency, when compared to the prevalently informative nature of Xu’s and Wei 
Yuan’s works. 
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In 1902, a few decades after the publication of Xu’s accounts, Yang Yulin 杨毓麟 
(1872–1911), a Hunanese patriot fighting for the independence of his province in 
the last years of the Manchu rule over China, would optimistically claim: “We will 
turn my Hunan into a Cuba, we will turn my Hunan into a Switzerland” (Yang 
in Platt 2007, 119). The pairing between Cuba and Switzerland is interesting: it 
might suggest an anti-colonial interpretation of two very different historical ex-
periences, but the fact that this claim for independence was not directed towards 
foreign invaders, but rather against the Qing Court, underlines its autonomist 
component. Provincial independence was to those activists the only way towards a 
new China, free from Manchu domination but also free from an oppressive “cen-
tre” of internal domination. 
A much more famous revolutionary from Hunan, Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–
1976), would also use Switzerland as a model for his project of provincial auton-
omy in 1920 (before turning into an admirer of Qin Shi Huangdi 秦始皇帝 and 
of his hyper-centralism, once the CCP was set to conquer power at the national 
level): “Some people regard Hunan as the Switzerland of the East. We can indeed 
look at Switzerland as a model for our ideal Hunan” (Mao in Platt 2007, 195).6 
“Turning Swiss” might have been an unprecedented—and exotic—slogan for 
Hunan. Yet, a book with this title by Thomas Brady, published in 1985, shows 
how this had been a relatively popular political claim across 15th-century central 
Europe (a historical fact which, we would guess, was not common knowledge in 
20th century Hunan).
At that time, in the decades preceding the Reformation, the Swiss confedera-
cy was a powerful “political model for surrounding peoples” (especially in South 
Germany), a freedom-based model which appeared to “reproduce itself by exam-
ple” (Brady 1985, 30). In that context, “turning Swiss” became a “revery” for the 
country’s neighbours as a new concept of “liberty” seemed to threaten the Impe-
rial order (ibid. 34).
Liberty in the old sense, which began to fade during the seventeenth 
century, appeared in the heart of the feudal order and could, and did, be-
come lordship’s bitterest foe. It could mean a monastery’s immunities, a 
city-state’s autonomy, the clergy’s freedom from lay jurisdiction, the pro-
vincial estates’ rights to consent to taxes, or simply the rights of self-ad-
ministration of a city or of a rural folk. Though radically egalitarian only 
by contrast with dominant social patterns, nowhere did liberty in this 
6 Mao, “Declaration on the Occasion of the Founding of the Association for Promoting Reform in 
Hunan”, again quoted in Platt (2007, 195).
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sense flourish more radically than in the Swiss Confederacy, and there 
nowhere more fully than in the Forest Cantons. What seems radical 
about this self-administration of ordinary people is the association of 
liberty with productive labor, a European idea that departed dramatical-
ly from Graeco-Roman culture’s belief in the incompatibility of human 
labor with true humanity. The disruptive power of the idea of liberty lay 
therefore not so much in its formal definition as in its extension to the 
commons, those free and mostly free persons who were normally ruled 
by their social betters and who “are now allowed to have minds and 
spirits”. (ibid., 6) 
“They deprive the nobles against their will of their serfs” and “make the sub-
jects disobedient” (ibid., 31), a Habsburg supporter lamented, commenting on the 
Swiss threat against the imperial system. Through the eyes of those whose author-
ity was menaced by it, the Swiss model appeared as the negation of a naturally 
hierarchical political order. It is easy to imagine that the Imperial Confucian bu-
reaucrats at Court, facing the demands for a larger degree of local autonomy or—
even worse—some forms of communal liberty and “self-administration” raised by 
Yang Yulin and his fellows, would have shared the contempt of the Habsburg sup-
porters, rather than the 21st-century admiring look of Su Yigong at the fulfilment 
of a Confucian “royal way”. The emergence of small and autonomous (and dem-
ocratic) polities might have realized a utopian condition in literature, but when 
applied to politics it would have presented a dystopic threat to the Confucian-le-
galist principle of a single and undisputable source of authority and legitimacy for 
the entire tianxia (天下)—a barbaric subversion of the necessary hierarchy that 
assigns the junzi 君子 (gentleman) and the xiaoren 小人 (common man) to their 
respective duties and positions.7 Facing the crisis of the Qing, the idea of localism 
started to attract more interest, seen as all the more exciting in the radical politi-
cal change that it would bring to a traditionally holistic conception of the polity. 
And again, Yang Yulin’s coupling of Cuba and Switzerland in his pamphlet seems 
to suggest this conceptual focus on the issue of self-determination and rupture of 
an Imperial (or imperialistic) political order in the name of grassroots freedom. 
As Luo Zhitian wrote in this context, 
Shortly after the Boxer disaster, Chinese scholars began to feel that the 
Qing government could not be relied upon to save the country and start-
ed engaging in a type of intellectual gymnastics that resulted in the no-
tion that national salvation could only be achieved without the central 
7 On the endurance of monarchic values in China, see Pines (2012). 
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government, only through the fragmentary method of local self-rule (di-
fang zili 地方自立). (Luo 2017, 324) 
Back to Utopia: Kang Youwei in the “Garden of Europe”
As for the fortunes of the “Helvetic model” across Europe and America, in the 
centuries following the Reformation idealizing the political system of Switzer-
land became ever more common, especially among Republican thinkers or feder-
alist theorists—from Rousseau (who defined the Swiss “among the happiest peo-
ple in the world”) to John Adams (who praised the canton of Neuchatel as having 
“the only constitution in which the citizens can truly be said in that happy con-
dition of freedom and discipline, sovereignty and subordination”) (see Maissen 
2019). Xu Jiyu’s description of the country, noted above, clearly carries an echo of 
that laudatory tradition. Two years after the appearance of Yang Yulin’s pamphlet 
in Hunan, a prominent Chinese intellectual—who was fighting his political battle 
on the opposite camp, advocating the re-centralization and constitutionalization 
of the Manchu monarchy—was equally fascinated by Switzerland as such a “hap-
py” place. In contrast to Yang, though, Kang Youwei 康有为 (1858–1927) had ac-
tually been to that small and diverse European country. His impressions became a 
short text among his collection of travel journals from Europe. 
The following excerpts clearly show the picturesque (and again, almost unrealis-
tically utopian) impression left in Kang’s eyes by the Swiss confederacy in 1904. 
Switzerland is not a country; it is the garden of Europe. And it is not just 
a garden for Europe; in fact, it is an unsurpassed place of pleasure for the 
entire world. 
Family houses along the lakes are incredibly old and their gardens are sur-
rounded by small fences; up and down on the mountains, you can see so 
many churches, but they are old and covered with white dust, many of 
them shabby and run-down. There are villages with a hundred families, and 
some three-storied houses are extremely worn-out; villagers are poor, but 
they collect firewood and carry it on their backs to embellish their homes. 
People living on the Swiss mountains are so poor, their homes so humble ... 
Even in the city of Luzern, the buildings along the main avenues are 
modest, houses are low, streets are narrow: being surrounded by mountain 
peaks, they have had no development, and their old traditions are still 
preserved. 
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Walking in the capital you won’t find shops: people are too poor to go 
shopping, and there is nothing worth seeing except for the Parliament, 
the University, the Museum, that are all nice and new.8 (in Kang 2007, 
book 7) (author’s translation)
Poor and happy, Switzerland appears as an almost idyllic context in which there is 
no need for authoritarianism or political coercion: 
Their political system is extremely egalitarian, every individual has the 
right to vote. 
All the political power emanates from the Parliament which convenes in 
the Swiss capital, they have no Imperial Palace and they have no pres-
ident. As they have no president, instead of him they have a speaker.9 
(ibid.) (author’s translation)
As noted earlier, differently from Yang and other “provincial patriots”, Kang could 
not be counted among the supporters of federalism, of Republicanism (at least in 
his activity as a political activist for China) or provincial independence. On the 
contrary, his failed reform plan of 1898 for the transformation of the Qing into a 
constitutional monarchy might be considered as the last attempt at re-centraliz-
ing the ailing Manchu dynasty, a response to the increased provincial power from 
the Taiping War onwards, rather than a blueprint for de-centralization.10 
Kang’s fascination with Switzerland, then, reflects his utopian propensity, more 
than his concrete political plans. Such a propensity—built over his progressive in-
terpretation of Confucianism and his linear view of history as moving from chaos 
and separation to order and unity—would be fully expressed in the Datongshu 大
同书 (Book of Great Concord). In this text, allegedly completed in 1902, but deriv-
ing from a much longer reflection started in the 1880s—and fully revealed to the 







可观，惟议院、大学、博物院，三者皆新稍可人耳。In the following decades, more Chinese 
intellectuals, journalists or officials would visit Switzerland and write their impressions. A collec-
tion (translated into German) is provided by Fröhlich and Gassmann (2000). 
9 其政最平等，人人皆有选举权。瑞士京之议院，盖全瑞政权之所自出，以其别无王宫，亦
无总统署。盖瑞士无总统，只有议长。
10 For an in-depth study of the 1898 reforms, see Karl and Zarrow (2002). 
Azijske_studije_2021_2_FINAL.indd   155 6. 05. 2021   12:47:36
156 Federico BRUSADELLI: Swiss Enchantment: Modern Chinese Intellectuals...
march from conflicts and suffering to an age of global stability. At the end of his-
tory, a one-world democratic and republican government, in which political offic-
es are time-limited and elective, will rule over the entire planet, abolishing bound-
aries (social, economic, sexual, racial, linguistic, religious) and granting peace and 
welfare for every individual. At first sight, the political system imagined for the 
Age of Supreme Equality very much resembles a “globalization” of the Swiss di-
rect democratic model. At the same time, however, Kang’s one-world utopia does 
not seem to adopt the Swiss federalist structure (and inspiration). If we define fed-
eralism as underpinned by the principle of a “shared rule” (Kincaid 2011)—and, 
from a cultural point of view, as a system based on and conducive to the accept-
ance of linguistic, religious, ethnic pluralism—then the utopian world cultivated 
by Kang out of the classical concept of Datong (大同) does not seem to be in-
spired by such a necessity for the preservation of pluralism. On the contrary, the 
Great Concord is the universal expansion of a process of centralization—meaning 
central planning and redistribution of resources, and centralized institutions—
from the national to the global level.11 Kang thus offers yet another variation on 
the Swiss conceptual theme. Admired for its peace and frugality, the country is 
seen as something of a utopia for its democratic and republican system, which is 
openly praised (including the practice of a “collective leadership”); but its federal-
ism—so central in the rhetoric of Hunan’s independentists—is left out of the pic-
ture. The ultimate goal of history, according to Kang, is the highest possible degree 
of unity as a protection against conflict. If Switzerland recognizes linguistic and 
religious pluralism, in the world of Datong only one language will be spoken and 
religion will exhaust its function, as the hopes and aspirations of mankind will be 
fulfilled by the power of technology and pervasive socio-political planning. The 
need for a universal homogeneity, as marshalled by Kang, makes the Swiss garden 
an idyllic but politically fragile solution to the pressing questions of “modernity”. 
Liang Qichao and Chen Jiongming: Switzerland and the “Immaturity” 
of China
A few years after Kang’s Swiss travelogue, his most famous pupil would cast a 
less picturesque and more substantially political look at the confederacy, consid-
ering Bern as a potential (although ultimately discarded) model for actual reform. 
In “Issues Concerning the Construction of a New China” (Xin Zhongguo jian-
she wenti 新中国建设问题) written in 1911 during the tumultuous revolutionary 
11 For an analysis of Kang’s apparently ambiguous reflections on democracy and republicanism, fo-
cusing on his two-sided (utopian vs. statist) approach to political action, see Brusadelli (2017). 
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autumn, Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873–1929) describes the institutional asset of 
the small country at the heart of Europe as part of a survey of the possible models 
for post-Imperial China: 
How about a political system with no head of state? This is possible with-
out incurring in frauds and problems only in very small countries like 
Switzerland. The power of the Swiss central institutions can be extremely 
weak, and in cases of extremely important laws the National Assembly 
hands the power to vote to every citizen.
This is a country that has been always neutral, with no foreign aggres-
sion, small and scarcely populated, with a perfected habit of self-gov-
erning, which therefore did not aim at a strong government. As for our 
country, if we do not get a strong and powerful central government, how 
could we even survive as a country?12 (Liang 1999, vol. 8, 2434) (author’s 
translation)
The key element in Liang’s reflection—and in his subsequent considered rejection 
of the Swiss model—is, again, the acknowledgement of the necessity of having 
a strong central authority in China. Even for a convinced reformer like Liang, 
the Confucian-Legalist paradigm of a central power, hierarchically superior to 
any possible local sub-power, cannot be sacrificed on the altar of representative 
democracy. If modernization means building a stronger and more efficient state, 
the geographical, social, cultural and external conditions of China—in combina-
tion with the existential threat posed by the foreign powers—make it imperative 
to look at centralizing processes rather than at a radically federal solution. And 
if China needs a new and “modern” community of citizens, as Liang firmly be-
lieved, this requires a centralized nation to be constituted and nurtured, without 
dispersing energies on the local level, at least until those “new citizens” are mature 
enough to make decisions at a grassroots level without jeopardizing national uni-
ty. Japan or Germany, countries that interpreted local government not in terms 
of federalism—as a “shared rule”—but as a top-down “devolution” of power, are 
taken by Liang as better examples than the ultimately ‘utopian’ Swiss institutional 
architecture. 
Although put aside by Liang, Switzerland unsurprisingly became the focus of at-
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movements that thrived during the following decade, partially following on the 
steps of the “local patriots” of the pre-1911 period.
After the provincial secessions of 1911/1912, and before the success of Jiang 
Jieshi’s 蒋介石 (1887–1975) reunification in 1927, the adoption of a federalist in-
stitutional asset seemed to be a reasonable solution for post-Imperial China. One 
of the most complete and detailed plans for a federal China—and at the same time 
one of the last attempts at providing a political alternative to the centralism of the 
Guomindang (GMD)—was written during the completion of the Northern Ex-
pedition by the “intellectual warlord” Chen Jiongming 陈炯明 (1878–1933). 
A key ally of Sun Yat-sen 孙中山 (1866–1925) in 1911, then governor of Guang-
dong, Chen opposed the GMD’s idea of using the southern province’s revenue 
to finance the Northern Expedition in 1923–1924. His defence of the local pre-
rogatives of Guangzhou led him to a conflict with the father of the Republic that 
marked him as a traitor.13 Sun’s turn to the Soviet Union influenced his own polit-
ical agenda: his federalist sympathy was buried under the Leninist organizational 
model of democratic centralism, thus fuelling the conflict with Chen. 
After fleeing to Hong Kong, Chen would continue to advocate a federal solution 
to the division of China. In 1927, as the GMD was finally conquering the North, 
fulfilling Sun’s dream of a newly reunified Republic under the control of a strong 
central administration, the exiled Chen published his own roadmap for a different 
kind of national reunification. 
In his Modest Proposal for the Unification of China (Zhongguo tongyi chuyi 中国统
一刍议) (1927), Chen wanted to prove that a convinced federalist could also be a 
“national patriot”. He drafted a program that, at least in his opinion, would har-
moniously blend a democratic approach to local legitimacy with the need for a 
strong state (and for a unified military, overall). It is not the work of a philosopher, 
but the reflection of a xiucai 秀才 “(talented official) of action”—the man that 
John Dewey described as “the most impressive of all the officials whom I have met 
in China” (Dewey in Chen 2000, 1).14 Opening with a foreword by the prominent 
nationalist intellectual Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936), the text provides an 
analysis of the chaos in Chinese that claims it is caused by six elements: the ab-
sence of a constitution, the absence of a proper parliament, an unelected presi-
dent, an unchecked government, a decentralized army, and dysfunctional (and 
non-democratic) political parties. 
13 One example of the Communist narrative of Chen as a “traitor” can be found in Huang (2003). A 
rehabilitation of Chen’s federalism, inviting a rediscovery of his “sincere democratic spirit”, is at-
tempted by Duan and Ni (2008).
14 In his book, Leslie Chen presents an accurate analysis of his father’s political blueprint. 
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Chen’s solution to the broken Chinese state is then articulated along the follow-
ing lines: unifying the army; creating a political union, for permanent institutional 
stability (a significant move, by which he tries to conceptually disentangle “fed-
eralism” from the idea of division or fragmentation); putting power back into the 
people’s hands, thus defeating the “two jackals from the same cave” (the Southern 
one-party policies of Jiang’s GMD and the Northern military cliques, who were 
both preventing the emergence of a democratic China); and preserving the mul-
ti-ethnic nature of the traditional Empire in the new Chinese federation, as the 
first step to an Asian federation. 
Chen’s federal China should be based on three principles: the principle of self-gov-
ernment (zizhizhuyi 自治主义), thus fully legitimizing provincial institutions as 
“institutional actors”; the principle of self-sustainment (zijizhuyi 自给主义), as 
the foundation of a federal economy, through which a significant portion of local 
resources would be managed on a local level; and the principle of federation (li-
anhezhuyi 联合主义), the political core of the platform, which would provide the 
country with a set of shared institutions embodying the common identity of the 
Chinese people. 
When elaborating this last point, Chen interestingly presents the possible models 
through which “federative processes” might be implemented. 
Here, following Liang’s method, Chen surveys some of the possible models China 
could look at. After examining presidentialism and the British cabinet-system—
both unsuccessfully applied by Republican China, Chen says—he discusses the 
“committee system” (weiyuanzhi 委员制), which he ascribes to Switzerland: 
The committee system is in vogue now—it was even experimented with by 
members of the Party—and if the results were not noteworthy, this is not 
due to the system itself. Switzerland implements it with remarkable suc-
cess: a small country with many capable individuals, in which the people 
have a rich political experience, members of the administration are satisfied 
with their duty and follow the directives of the legislative body, and there 
is an appeal system that amends the shortcomings of the legislative body; 
that is why the system is implemented with full benefits. Let’s look at Chi-
na’s circumstances: would it be possible for us to rigorously adopt the Swiss 
system? It is not quite suitable, and it would need adjustments which are 
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Switzerland, once more, is examined, and almost uncritically praised, but ulti-
mately discarded as an extremely “exotic” political model, unfit for China. How-
ever, it is not federalism itself that is really addressed here by Chen, but the shared 
type of political leadership exercised by the federal government. Even if not di-
rectly related to the issue of local self-administration (which, in contrast, plays an 
important role in Chen’s plan), the Swiss institutional arrangement is again pre-
sented as characterized by the idea of a diffused political legitimacy—shared not 
just among different territories, but even among different individuals at the cen-
tral level, or often distributed among the common citizens. 
Although discarding the excessively “utopian” Swiss system, Chen’s proposal 
moves on to describe a federal and democratic plan for China, much closer to 
the Jeffersonian model than to the Soviet (or Prussian) centralized model, cher-
ished both by the Nationalists and the Communists after the mid-1920s. And yet 
Alexis de Tocqueville—whose praise for the American model as embodying the 
perfect balance between a central government responsible for the state’s general 
safety, and a decentralized administration allowing the full participation of the 
people, is justly celebrated—would perhaps have ironically sided with the GMD, 
in his conviction that China “provides the most perfect model of a centralized 
government that exists in the universe” (Tocqueville in Thompson 1988, 192). In 
this cross-cultural and diachronic game, Chen Jiongming would have found some 
comfort in the observations handed down by another French intellectual, Evar-
iste Huc (1813–1860), who praised instead the richness of China’s “decentralized 
administration” as a noteworthy feature of the Empire (Thompson 1988, 191). 
Conclusion: Utopia and Failure 
Evariste Huc and Chen Jiongming’s admiration for the local dimension of politi-
cal power in China would ultimately prove to be delusional. Federalism in gener-
al—even in its less utopian forms, as in Chen’s manifesto—missed the window of 
opportunity that had been opened from the Taiping rebellion (with the pendulum 
of power moving from the ailing Qing Court to the provincial governor) up to 
the early years of the Republic. Already in the mid-1920s, a decentralized China 
ceased to be considered a viable option, politically and conceptually. 
The closure of this path is confirmed by the fate of the term fengjian: for centuries 
used by the opponents of centralist authoritarianism as the marker of a more de-
centralized and balanced political system, and often used by proponents of mod-
ern Chinese federalism to anchor their model in some historical precedent—as it 
was discussed earlier in this paper—it started being used by Marxist intellectuals 
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to translate the negative concept of “feudalism” (see Dirlik 1996). Consequent-
ly, an originally neutral, or even positive historical concept (associated by Con-
fucianists with the golden age of the Zhou king and contrasted to the tyran-
nical centralization of the Qin), became irreversibly (and negatively) associated 
with pre-modern values: within the inescapable Marxist teleology, it was precisely 
“fengjian” (feudalism) that had been obstructing the linear and evolutionary pro-
gress of Chinese history for centuries. 
With this conceptual shift from “decentralization” (as a potentially positive solu-
tion to many of the political problems plaguing China) to “feudalization” (as an 
irredeemably negative historical experience)—a shift facilitated by the traumatic 
experience of the actual political and territorial division of China in the warlord 
era—federalism could not be seen as entailing modernity anymore. On the con-
trary, it became synonymous to the preservation of those traditional “local loy-
alties” that had repeatedly undermined national unity and left China vulnerable 
to external attacks. In the end, as Prasenjit Duara notes, “the interplay of power 
politics and authoritative language enabled the hegemonic, centralizing national-
ist narrative to destroy and ideologically bury the federalist alternative early in the 
history of modern China” (Duara 1995, 177–78). 
Back to Switzerland, then, for our conclusion. If countries can serve as concepts, 
and can be observed and interpreted as semantic coalescences in which—to fol-
low, again, Reinhart Koselleck—historical experiences are accumulated and for-
mulated and then projected on time, then the small Alpine country, temporalized 
and transformed into a “utopian” concept, appears as a counter-concept (Gegen-
begriffe) to “traditional China” intended negatively as a hyper-centralized polity.16 
As Poland was used in China across the 19th and 20th centuries as a warning 
on the danger of the “death of the country” (see Wagner 2017), so Switzerland 
emerged as an example of the utopian experience of an anti-monarchic and an-
ti-centralist polity. The fate of this political concept—in its different declensions, 
as we have briefly sketched above—ultimately reflects the problem for Chinese 
intellectuals or activists in conceptualizing federalism, or more generally the lack 
of a precise political/cultural centre. The Erfahrungsraum (“space of experience”) 
of Switzerland was therefore confined to a utopian dimension: from a Chinese 
perspective, it represented a fascinating program, unfortunately impossible to 
some, or potentially dangerous to others. This last connection—between the lack 
of a clear and unquestioned source of political/cultural authority and the implo-
sion of the country—became especially prevalent after the trauma of division and 
16 See Koselleck 1979, 349–75. A recent example of conceptual studies focusing on geographical con-
cepts is provided by Mishkova and Trencsényi (2017). 
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internal violence experienced during the warlord era, thus strengthening the ide-
ological links among feudalism, localism and separatism. Breaking the totem of 
monarchism and the probably stronger myth of centralism represented a fracture 
that required some kind of “utopian projection” to be accepted. The “exoticization” 
of Switzerland and the political (and conceptual) failure of federalism in China 
thus seem to be connected: elaborating a shared view of sovereignty, substituting 
the Imperial model of tianxia, by which authority necessarily flows from one un-
disputed source at the top of the system, and substituting it with a system that 
acknowledges polycentrism and institutionalizes the practice of self-government, 
was a difficult—finally impossible—task. A conceptual difficulty, as noted, both 
originating from and sustained by the dire historical circumstances of political 
fragmentation in the “dynastic cycle”. “In a world of disaggregated states”, writes 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “the sovereignty that has traditionally attached to unitary 
states should arguably also be disaggregated. Taking this step, however, requires a 
different conception of the very nature of sovereignty” (Slaughter 2004, 186). In 
those countries that successfully embraced it, federalism emerged in parallel to the 
acceptance of the idea of “fragmenting” the political order of the Empire, shifting 
the ideal of Unity from the Kingdom of Men to the separated religious dimension 
of the Kingdom of God. With no way out to a spiritual level separate from Nature 
(and from Politics), the Chinese concept of Unity/tianxia had to be formulated 
as pertaining to this world. As Yuri Pines points out, monarchic centralism served 
as one of the ideological pillars of the “everlasting empire”, whose legacy remains 
robust (Pines 2012). As the cult of centralism seems to be daily reaffirmed in Xi 
Jinping’s China, Su Yigong’s paper—with his praise for the Confucian (and an-
ti-legalist) Swiss model—provides a contrast that, in its echoing of fascinations 
with federalism from an exotic Occident, appears as counter-historical and uto-
pian as its predecessors.
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